Reasserting the primacy of broadcast political speech after Animal Defenders International? - Rogaland Pensioners Party v Norway by Lewis, T
1 
 
Reasserting the primacy of broadcast political speech after Animal Defenders 
International? ― Rogaland Pensioners Party v Norway 
 
Introduction 
 
It is an axiom that freedom of political expression is essential to the existence of 
political democracy.
1
 There may be some situations, however, in which unbridled 
freedom of speech will damage the democratic process, rather than foster it. One 
mode of expression which may give rise to such harm is that of political advertising 
on radio and television. Because of the great power and pervasiveness of these media 
it is likely that the domination of the airwaves by a particular political group will 
translate into electoral success. Consequently those with the funds to buy up airtime 
on which to put out their message will be at an advantage over their less wealthy 
political opponents; there is a risk that the playing field of political debate will be 
distorted in favour of those with the greatest resources to the detriment of the less well 
off.  In order to avoid these consequences ― in order to protect equality of political 
opportunity ― many European states have imposed broadcasting bans on political 
advertising.  For example, in the UK the Communications Act 2003 imposes a ban on 
all political advertising on the broadcast media.
2
  During its passage through 
Parliament the prohibition was justified by the government on the basis that ‗denying 
                                                 
1
 See generally E Barendt, Freedom of Speech (2
nd
 edn OUP, Oxford 2005).  
2
 Sections 319 and 321.  The ban applies to adverts which are ‗by or on behalf of a body whose objects 
are wholly or mainly of a political nature‘ (s 321(2)(a)) or are themselves ‗directed towards a political 
end‘ (s 321(2)(b)).  
P
st-P
int
2 
 
powerful interests the chance to skew political debate … safeguard[ed] the public and 
democratic debate, and protect[ed] the impartiality of broadcasters‘.3   
 
   In recent years, perhaps unsurprisingly, such bans have been subjected to legal 
challenge, before both the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) and domestic 
courts, on the grounds that they are incompatible with the right to freedom of 
expression under article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).  
For example in VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland (VgT)
 
the Court held 
that a Swiss broadcasting ban on political advertising which prevented a small 
vegetarian organisation from airing an advert responding to commercials by the meat 
industry constituted a disproportionate interference with its article 10 rights.
 4
  In 
particular the Court noted that, whilst the ban was intended to prevent powerful 
financial groups from gaining undue influence in the political process, the applicant 
itself was not such a group — all it wanted was to ‗participate in an ongoing general 
debate on animal protection and the rearing of animals‘.5  When deciding what 
restrictions upon commercial advertising are necessary the Court acknowledged that 
states are usually entitled to a margin of appreciation.  In a case such as this, however, 
concerning participation in a ‗debate affecting the general interest‘, this margin of 
                                                 
3
 Hansard HC vol 395 col 788 (3 December 2002) (Tessa Jowell MP, Secretary of State for Culture, 
Media and Sport). 
4
 (App No  24699/94) (2002) 34 EHRR 4.  Subsequent to this judgement VgT applied to the Swiss 
Federal Court to have the ban on its advertisement lifted. The Swiss court declined.  The European 
Court found there to be a further breach of article 10 in VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland 
(App No 32772/02) ECHR 4 October 2007.  The case was heard by the Grand Chamber on 9 July 
2008―judgment pending. 
5
 ibid para 75. 
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appreciation was reduced.
6
 Indeed, in the subsequent case of Murphy v Ireland, which 
concerned a broadcasting ban on religious advertising, the Court distinguished VgT on 
the basis of the content of the expression at issue — a much wider margin of 
appreciation was available to the state when regulating freedom of expression on 
‗matters liable to offend intimate personal convictions within the sphere of morals or, 
especially, religion‘.7  Consequently, in contrast to the political advertising ban in 
VgT, the Irish ban was found not to breach the applicant‘s article 10 rights. 
 
   The Court has recently revisited the issue of broadcasting bans on political 
advertisements in TV Vest AS and Rogaland Pensjonistparti v Norway (Pensioners 
Party), reaffirming the approach that it took in VgT, and finding a violation of article 
10.
8
  This note will examine the Court‘s approach in Pensioners Party and go on to 
consider the implications of the case in light of the apparently conflicting decision in 
R (Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture Media and Sport 
(ADI) in which a unanimous House of Lords held that the UK‘s ban under the 
Communications Act 2003 was not incompatible with article 10 ECHR.
9
   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 ibid para 71. 
7
  (App No 44179/98) (2004) 38 EHRR 182 para 67.  See A Geddis ‗You Can‘t Say ―God‖ on the 
Radio: Freedom of Expression, Religious Advertising and the Broadcast Media after Murphy v Ireland‘ 
[2004] EHRLR 182. 
8 (App  No  21132/05) ECHR 11 December 2008. 
9
 [2008] UKHL 15; [2008] 1 AC 1312. 
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The Pensioners Party case 
 
In the run up to local and regional elections in 2003, TV Vest AS, a Norwegian 
broadcaster, transmitted three different 15 second commercials by the Rogaland 
Pensioners Party, a small political party representing the interests of the elderly.  The 
advertisements aimed to portray the party‘s values and included invitations to vote for 
it.  The text of one of the adverts, representative of the others in tone and content, 
read:  
 
Tor Kristian Rønneberg, Pensioners Party: A sufficient number of good 
nursing home places.  Secure jobs, particularly for older workers, and decent 
pension schemes.  If you are interested in any of this, vote for the Pensioners 
Party. 
Picture with text: 
We need your vote on 15 September! Vote for the Pensioners Party. 
 
The adverts were aired despite prior warnings from the State Media Authority that to 
do so would breach section 3-1(3) of the Broadcasting Act 1992 which imposed a 
blanket ban on all political advertising on Norwegian television. After the 
transmission the broadcaster was fined NOK 35 000 by the Media Authority for 
violation of the ban. A series of domestic appeals claiming a breach of article 10 of 
the ECHR, ending in the Supreme Court, failed.   
 
   The broadcaster and the party applied to the European Court of Human Rights 
claiming that a complete ban on all political advertising on television in Norway 
Post-Pri t
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constituted a violation of their rights under article 10 ECHR.
10
  The applicants argued 
that, because the Pensioners Party was small and impecunious, it ‗seldom got any 
focus in editorial television broadcasting and thus had a real need to establish direct 
communication with the electorate‘.11  The absence of a system of free party political 
broadcasts in Norway meant that political speech on television was ‗canalised through 
broadcasters‘ editorial staff functioning as gate keepers‘. This had the effect of 
favouring established political parties, while small parties were ‗prevented from 
gaining access to public space through television‘. 12   
 
   The Norwegian government argued that this was not primarily a case about freedom 
of expression, but rather about ensuring that ‗all political parties could compete on an 
equal footing‘.13  Given the fact that television was a pervasive and powerful medium 
and because there was no international consensus on the issue, the government 
claimed that it should be afforded a wide margin of appreciation in reaching the 
decision that a blanket ban was necessary to achieve the aim of preventing the 
airwaves being dominated by those political parties with the greatest financial 
resources at the expense of less wealthy groups.   
    
The judgment of the Strasbourg court  
 
                                                 
10
 (App  No  21132/05) ECHR 11 December 2008. 
11
 ibid para 33. 
12
 ibid para 34. 
13
 ibid para 41. 
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The Strasbourg court, having recited its usual mantra that there is little scope under 
article 10 for restrictions of political speech, nevertheless acknowledged that the 
audio-visual media are more powerful and immediate than the print media and that 
sometimes it might be necessary to restrict freedom of political expression in order to 
protect the integrity of democracy itself, to ensure the ‗free expression of the people 
in the choice of the legislature‘ which itself is protected by article 3 of protocol 1 
ECHR.
14
 
 
  On the facts of the Pensioners Party case, however, the Court found there to be a 
breach of article 10.  The indisputably ‗political nature of the advertisements … called 
for a strict scrutiny on the part of the Court and a correspondingly circumscribed 
national margin of appreciation with regard to the necessity of the restriction‘. 15  
Whilst the absence of a European consensus on the issue might justify a wider margin 
than would normally be accorded with respect to restrictions on political speech, the 
Court could not accept that the prohibition in this case came within Norway‘s margin 
of appreciation.  For a start, whilst the ban may have been intended to prevent wealthy 
interests from obtaining unfair political advantage, the Pensioners Party itself did not 
fall into this group.
16
  Rather it belonged to that very category of parties (small and 
impecunious) whose interests the ban was intended to protect. Whilst the major 
political parties ‗were given a large amount of attention in the edited television 
coverage the Pensioners Party was hardly mentioned‘.  Consequently, paid advertising 
on television was the only way for the Pensioners Party to get its message across to 
                                                 
14
 ibid para 61.  
15
 ibid para 64. 
16
  ibid para 72. 
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the public in this medium; and by being denied this possibility it was placed at a 
disadvantage compared to the major parties which could not be offset by the access it 
did have to other less potent media, such as newspapers.
17
  Consequently the ban 
constituted a disproportionate interference with the applicants‘ article 10 rights. 
 
Implications of the Pensioners Party case 
 
The judgment of the Court in Pensioners Party is highly significant for the UK since, 
as noted above, the Communications Act 2003 imposes a blanket broadcasting ban on 
political advertising similar to that in Norway.
18
  In R (Animal Defenders 
International) v Secretary of State for Culture Media and Sport the House of Lords 
held that, notwithstanding its all embracing nature, the Communications Act ban did 
not infringe the article 10 rights of a non-charitable animal welfare organisation that 
had been prevented from broadcasting an advertisement publicising the suffering of 
primates.
19
  Their Lordships held unanimously that the question of how to balance 
freedom of expression and the protection of the political process was best resolved by 
elected MPs.  Given the power and pervasiveness of TV, ‗great weight‘ had to be 
accorded  to Parliament‘s view that it was necessary to impose a blanket broadcasting 
ban on all ‗political‘ advertisements, and that a more nuanced regime which did take 
account of individual cases, or a system of rationing or capping, was not workable 
                                                 
17
  ibid para 73. 
18
 See s 319 and s 321. The term ‗political‘ is defined very widely in s 321 so as to include not just 
adverts by political parties but also, amongst others, those ‗influencing the policies or decisions of 
governments‘ in the UK or elsewhere (s 321(3)(c)) and those ‗influencing public opinion on a matter 
which, in the UK, is a matter of public controversy‘ (s 321(3)(f)). 
19
 ADI (n 9). 
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since it would lead inevitably to uncertainty, unfairness and to many legal 
challenges.
20
  
 
   The decision in ADI was reached against the backdrop of VgT in which, it will be 
recalled, the Strasbourg court had held that a similar Swiss broadcasting ban on 
political advertising breached article 10.
21
  The judgment in VgT has been the subject 
of much criticism by British judges.  For example in R (ProLife Alliance) v BBC Lord 
Hoffmann referred to it as a ‗guarded and somewhat opaque decision‘ 22 whilst Lord 
Walker criticised the Court for its failure to ‗give full or clear reasons for what seems 
to be a far reaching conclusion‘, adding that the ‗true significance of the … case [was] 
therefore rather imponderable‘.23 In ADI, at first instance, the reasoning in VgT was 
dismissed as ‗fact-sensitive and … arguably aberrant‘24 and when the (leapfrogged) 
appeal reached the House of Lords VgT was side-stepped by Lord Bingham who 
stated that the argument that it was necessary to keep the ‗playing field of debate … 
so far as practicable level‘, in order to protect democracy, had not been ‗deployed‘ to 
its ‗full strength‘ in that case. Furthermore, he noted, VgT‘s advert had been in 
response to commercials by the meat industry — whereas ADI were not responding to 
anything.
25
    
                                                 
20
 ibid paras 31 - 33 (Lord Bingham).  See T Lewis and P Cumper, ‗Balancing Freedom of Political 
Expression against Equality of Political Opportunity: the Courts and the UK Broadcasting Ban on 
Political Advertising‘ [2009] PL 89. 
21
 VgT (n 4). 
22
 [2003] UKHL 23; [2004] 1 A.C. 185. [64] (Lord Hoffmann). 
23
  ibid paras 128 – 129 (Lord Walker). 
24
  [2006] EWHC 3069 (Admin) para 30 (Auld LJ). See also paras 118 – 120 (Ousley J). 
25
 ADI (n 9) para 29 (Lord Bingham). See also para 43 (Lord Scott) and  para 52 (Baroness Hale). 
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   Strongly indicative of the British government’s approach to the issue of political 
advertising on television is the fact that, in Pensioners Party itself, the UK intervened 
as a third party, arguing that a wide margin of appreciation should be afforded to the 
state and that the Court should either confine VgT to its precise facts or depart from its 
reasoning.
26
   
 
   The Court‘s judgment in Pensioners Party, strongly reaffirming as it does its earlier 
approach in VgT, undermines the decision of the House of Lords in ADI, as well as 
the view of the UK government.  Firstly, it will be recalled, Lord Bingham 
distinguished VgT, partly on the grounds that the argument that it was necessary to 
protect the level playing field of political debate from the ‗potential mischief of partial 
political advertising‘ had not been ‗deployed‘ to its ‗full strength‘ in that case.  It is 
safe to say, however, that in Pensioners Party the Norwegian government, as well as 
the intervening governments of Ireland and the UK, unreservedly did deploy the 
arguments in favour to the prohibition to their full strength.  The UK even went so far 
as to include a copy of the House of Lords‘ judgment in its submissions to the Court; 
and yet still the Strasbourg court found there to be a breach of article 10. 
 
                                                 
26
 Pensioners  Party (n 8) para 55.  Ireland also intervened as a third party, making similar arguments.  
It should be remembered that the UK government introduced, and Parliament passed, the 
Communications Act in full knowledge of the VgT judgment.  The government even made a s 19(1) (b) 
HRA statement to the effect that it was unable to make a statement of compatibility, on account of VgT, 
yet wished to proceed with the Bill anyway.  
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   Furthermore, in ADI their Lordships stressed the highly fact specific nature of the 
VgT case, thereby down-playing its relevance to the UK.
27
  This argument was also 
put by the Norwegian and intervening governments in Pensioners Party.
28
   The 
European Court however was emphatically not prepared to confine VgT to its precise 
facts.  On the contrary, it extended protection to a political party that was putting out 
its message and making itself known in the run up to elections.  
 
    In ADI the appellants had accepted that it would have been legitimate under article 
10 to impose some restrictions on TV political advertising, for example those by 
political parties, especially at election time.  For this could be a finely tuned and 
surgical response to the threats posed to the democratic process by unbridled political 
advertising.  What ADI claimed, though, was that an all enveloping blanket ban which 
caught their non-party political ‗social advocacy‘ advertisement was a 
disproportionate interference with their article 10 rights.
29
  The Pensioners Party case, 
however, concerned political speech in the strict sense — a political party soliciting 
votes in elections ― exactly the sort of advertising that, everyone in ADI had 
assumed,  it was permissible to prohibit.  Yet the European Court, noting the ‗absolute 
and permanent‘ nature of the Norwegian ban, coupled with the extremely limited 
alternative channels of communication open to the Pensioners Party (in comparison to 
bigger, more established parties), still found that it violated article 10.  The judgment 
therefore not only reaffirms the Court‘s approach in  VgT  but actually goes quite a bit  
                                                 
27
 ADI (n 9) para 43 (Lord Scott) and para 52 (Baroness Hale). 
28
 Pensioners’ Party (n 8) paras 50, 53 and 54.   
29
 For a critique of the impact of the ban on ‗social advocacy advertising‘ see A Scott ‗―A Monstrous 
and Unjustifiable Infringement‖?: Political Expression and the Broadcasting Ban on Advocacy 
Advertising‘ (2003) 66 MLR 224. 
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further than that case, pushing the protection afforded into the core territory of 
political expression ― that area where the ‗protecting democracy‘ arguments 
militating in favour of restriction would seem to be at their strongest. 
 
   Perhaps the key determinant in all these cases is the degree of latitude that it is 
appropriate for a court (whether international or domestic) to afford to a state or 
legislature in deciding how best to strike the difficult balance between protecting 
freedom of political expression and protecting the integrity of democracy.  It has been 
generally accepted that some restrictions on expression may be necessary in order to 
prevent the field of political debate being unfairly tilted in favour of the wealthiest 
players.  Indeed in VgT itself the Court accepted that ‗prohibition[s] of ―political 
advertising‖ may be compatible with the requirements of Article 10 … in certain 
situations‘.30   But how much weight should be given to a national legislature‘s 
decision that the ‗line … be drawn‘ in one place rather than another, especially where 
the decision arrived at is that a blanket ban should be imposed because of the 
difficulties inherent in devising alternative schemes?
31
    The House of Lords in ADI 
answered this question by holding that ‗great weight‘ had to be given to Parliament‘s 
decision to impose a blanket ban; and that compromise solutions (like filtering, 
capping or rationing) were not possible since, amongst other reasons, it was 
‗reasonable to expect that our democratically-elected politicians [would] be peculiarly 
sensitive to the measures necessary to safeguard the integrity of our democracy [and it 
                                                 
30
 VgT (n 4) para 75.  In his concurring opinion in Pensioners Party (n 8) Judge Jebens, at para 3, said 
that he could see no reason why restrictions on paid political advertisements could not be acceptable as 
long as political parties and interest groups were afforded reasonable access to the media; he stressed 
the need for ‗individual solutions‘ according to the precise facts of the case. 
31
 ADI (n 9) para 33 (Lord Bingham). 
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could not] be supposed that others, including judges, [would] be more so‘.32  
Likewise, in Pensioners Party,  the Norwegian government argued that it would be 
impossible to allow for exceptions to the ban so as to permit adverts by smaller 
parties; for this would be ‗difficult to apply fairly, objectively and coherently … a 
total ban would  generate less discomfort‘ than a system of ‗filtering‘ on a case by 
case basis.
33
  On such a question as this, Norway argued, concerning the best way to 
secure the integrity of its own democratic process, ‗the national elected representative 
bodies‘ were better equipped than national or international courts to make the 
assessment as to what level of restriction was necessary.   
  
   These arguments were rejected by the Strasbourg court.
34
  Whilst it did not pass 
direct comment on whether, at domestic level, the elected or judicial branches should 
have the main say, this being a matter of ‗national constitutional law‘ which fell to the 
‗Contracting States to solve within their own domestic legal systems‘35 it did 
pronounce quite clearly on the margin of appreciation to be afforded at European 
level: ‗the political nature of the advertisements that were prohibited calls for a strict 
scrutiny on the part of the Court and a correspondingly circumscribed national margin 
of appreciation with regard to the necessity of restrictions‘.36   
                                                 
32
 ibid. 
33
 Pensioner’s Party (n 8) para 48.  See also the Norwegian Supreme Court‘s decision at para 62, cited 
in Pensioner’s Party (n 8) para 20. 
34
 It should be recalled that the UK Government submitted a copy of the House of Lords ADI 
judgement in its intervention in Pensioners Party. The Court rejected the arguments of the intervening 
governments expressly at para 77. 
35
 Pensioner’s Party (n 8) para 68. 
36
 ibid para 65. 
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   One further point might be ventured in respect of the degree of latitude to be 
afforded by courts to states and their legislatures.  In ADI Lord Bingham had cited the 
Strasbourg court‘s judgment in Murphy v Ireland,37 concerning a broadcasting ban on 
religious advertisements, as authority for the proposition that judges should accept the 
national legislature‘s view that devising workable alternatives to a blanket ban would 
be too difficult: 
 
[I]n Murphy … the European court recognised the difficulty of invigilating 
religious adverts fairly, objectively and coherently on a case by case basis and 
exactly the same difficulty would arise here [in the case of political adverts], 
perhaps even more embarrassingly.
38
 (emphasis added) 
 
But in Pensioners Party the Court  rejected this explanation of its case law: rather it 
was the ‗sensitivities as to divisiveness or offensiveness‘, present in the religious 
advert in Murphy,  but absent  in the political adverts in VgT and Pensioners Party, 
‗that led [it] to accept that filtering by a public authority on a case by case basis, of 
unacceptable or excessive religious advertising would be difficult to apply fairly, 
objectively and coherently and that a blanket ban would generate less discomfort‘.39 
 
  All in all it would seem that, notwithstanding national courts‘ strong inclinations to 
show a large measure of deference to the will of the democratically elected organs of 
                                                 
37
 Murphy (n 7). 
38
 ADI (n 9) para 31. 
39
 Pensioner‘s Party (n 8) para 75. 
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governance, this will not be reflected in the approach of the Strasbourg court.  After 
Pensioners Party it is clear that the margin of appreciation to be afforded by the 
European Court to states imposing blanket bans on political advertising in the 
broadcast media will be narrow indeed.  Consequently, it could be argued, the degree 
of latitude to be shown by domestic courts to national legislatures imposing such bans 
ought to be correspondingly limited. 
    
 A ‘right to broadcast’? 
 
The question arises: does the judgment in Pensioners Party, in combination with that 
in VgT, confer a ‗right of access‘ to broadcasting space in order to be able to transmit 
political or quasi-political messages? It has often been stated that article 10 confers no 
such entitlement. For example in ProLife Alliance, Lord Hoffmann observed that 
there was ‗no human right to use a television channel‘.40  One possibly far reaching 
effect of VgT and Pensioners Party, however, may be to confer some such right of 
access in order for political groups and NGOs to be able to communicate their 
messages effectively, in situations where those putting out opposing or competing 
messages do have such access.  
 
   It might be noted that a close reading of the speeches in ADI itself reveals that their 
Lordships, perhaps reluctant that their judgment be seen as immunizing the UK ban 
                                                 
40
 [2003] UKHL 23; [2004] 1 AC 185 para 57 (Lord Hoffmann); see also para 8 (Lord Nicholls) and 
para 129 (Lord Walker).  See also ADI (n 9) para 26 (Lord Bingham) and, eg  Haider v Austria (App 
No 25060/94) 18
 
October 1996 at 66. 
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against future article 10 challenge, suggested that bodies such as ADI might have a 
right of access in some situations.  For example Lord Bingham stated, obiter, that:  
 
[i]f ... a body ... had grounds for wishing to counter the effect of commercial 
advertising bearing on an issue of public controversy, it would have strong 
grounds for seeking to put its case in the ordinary course of broadcast 
programmes.  The broadcaster, discharging its duty of impartiality, could not 
ignore such a request.
41
 
 
Lord Scott, clearly uncomfortable at the ban‘s ‗remarkable‘ width, 42 went further 
still, observing that adverts for circuses or zoos might offend members of groups like 
ADI, or adverts for burgers might offend groups who disagree with the way beef 
cattle are reared and slaughtered. He posed the question: ‗Why should these 
organisations not counter the broadcasting of advertisements that offend their 
principles with the broadcasting of their own advertisements promoting their 
principles?‘43   It may be, therefore, that in some circumstances at least, there can now 
be said to exist a ‗right to broadcast‘ under article 10 ECHR. 
 
   The clear implication of these obiter remarks is that if a challenge were to be 
brought, based on a different set of facts to those in ADI  (eg where the proposed 
‗political‘ advert is in response to a commercial campaign) a UK court would be 
likely to find the ban to be incompatible with article 10.  This leads us, in the 
                                                 
41
 ibid para 34 (Lord Bingham).  
42
 Ibid para 41 (Lord Scott). 
43
 ibid para 41 (Lord Scott). 
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following section, to a brief consideration of the differing adjudicative methodologies 
used, respectively, by the European and domestic courts. 
 
Fact-sensitivity versus the ‘broad brush’? 
 
Under the Human Rights Act there are two remedial avenues open to litigants who 
claim that legislation breaches their rights.  Firstly, they can argue that s 3 should be 
used, so that the legislation is, ‗as far as possible‘, ‗read and given effect‘ in a way 
that is compatible with the Convention right; secondly, if the s 3 route is not 
‗possible‘ because it involves doing too much violence to clear legislative words that 
demonstrate the intention of Parliament, a declaration of incompatibility under s 4 
may be sought. 
 
   In ADI it was common ground between the parties that the provision was too clearly 
drafted to be ‗read down‘ using s 3, so as to permit ADI‘s advert to be transmitted.44  
The applicants therefore sought a declaration under s 4 HRA that s 321(2) of the 
Communications Act was incompatible with article 10.  In other words ADI  
challenged the compatibility of the legislation itself.  In contrast, in VgT and 
Pensioners Party, the Strasbourg court addressed a quite different question, namely 
whether there had been a disproportionate interference with the article 10 rights of the 
particular applicants on the particular facts of their case.   
 
                                                 
44
 [2006] EWHC 3069 (Admin) para 2 (Auld LJ). 
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   In ADI, at first instance, this distinction between the adjudicative roles of the 
Strasbourg and UK courts had been stressed quite emphatically by Auld LJ.  The UK 
court‘s task was, he said: 
 
broader and not so fact sensitive [as that of the European Court], otherwise the 
compatibility with the ECHR of our legislation would be vulnerable to 
constant challenge and re-challenge according to the individual circumstances 
of each case.  In short, on a compatibility challenge, this Court has often to 
paint with a broader brush than the Strasbourg Court ... 
45
 
 The concern ... is as to the compatibility of the statutory prohibition, not as to 
a narrower question, namely whether ... a statutory prohibition is justifiable in 
the circumstances of the case.
46
 
 
Clearly, if this ‗all or nothing‘ view of s 4 were held to be correct, it would render any 
compatibility challenge to the  UK‘s broadcasting ban on political advertising nigh on 
impossible.  
 
   This approach, however, seems to have been rejected by the House of Lords who 
seemed to accept the appropriateness of some degree of adjudicative fact-sensitivity, 
even where a s 4 challenge is being mounted.  Thus Lord Scott, having expressed his 
unease at the breadth of the ban, concluded that there  
                                                 
45
 ibid para 40 (Auld LJ).    
46
 ibid para 69. See also paras 29 and 30. See T Lewis ―Rights Lost in Translation? Fact-insensitive 
Laws, the Human Rights Act and the UK‘s ban on Broadcast Political Advertising‖ [2007] EHRLR 
663. 
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may be respects in which sections 319 and 321 are incompatible with article 
10.  But the power to make a declaration of incompatibility ... is a 
discretionary power ... and as a general rule that discretion ought not to be 
exercised unless the circumstances of the case ... show that the legislative 
provision in question has affected a Convention right of the applicant ... in a 
manner that is incompatible with that right.
47
 
 
The necessary implication of this statement is that the s 4 discretion ought to be 
exercised where the circumstances of the case do show that the legislation has 
affected the applicant‘s Convention right in an incompatible manner.  Likewise 
Baroness Hale noted that the issue in the case was ‗whether the ban, as it applies to 
these facts, was proportionate to the legitimate aim of protecting the democratic rights 
of others‘.48 Moreover, as noted above, having found the legislation to be compatible 
with article 10 on the facts of ADI‘s case, their Lordships went on to suggest that 
there may be instances in which a challenge based on slightly different factual 
matrices might succeed after all, for example where an NGO was seeking to respond 
to commercial advertisements, or where an advert was deemed to be ‗political‘ solely 
because it sought to influence public opinion on a matter of public controversy (under 
s 321(3)(f)), or where a body whose objects were mainly or wholly of a political 
nature sought to broadcast an advertisement that was unconnected to its objects.
49
  
                                                 
47
 ADI (n 9) para 42 (Lord Scott).  
48
 ibid para 52 (Baroness Hale) (emphasis added).   
49
 ibid para 34 (Lord Bingham).  See also para 41 (Lord Scott) and para 52  (Baronness Hale), and text 
accompanying   n 41 and  n 43  above. 
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   It is apparent, therefore, that their Lordships did envisage the possibility of future 
challenges, based on different sets of facts; they acknowledged that a degree of 
adjudicative fact-sensitivity might be appropriate, even given the apparent remedial 
rigidity of s 4 HRA.
50
   
 
   Nevertheless, given the wide latitude afforded by their Lordships to Parliament on 
this issue in comparison to that granted by the European Court to states in VgT and 
Pensioners Party, coupled with the dauntingly powerful symbolic impact of a 
declaration of incompatibility under the HRA, it is likely that any challenger claiming 
that the legislation is incompatible on the facts of its particular case will have a more 
difficult task than an applicant at Strasbourg who merely has to show the 
disproportionality of the  impact of the legislation upon him. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As far as the UK is concerned there are still ways in which the Pensioners Party case 
is distinguishable from the British situation. In particular, in contrast to Norway, the 
UK does have a system of party political broadcasts, which entitles registered political 
parties to free airtime.
51
  However, whilst this argument might have some force in 
respect of a political party in the UK being denied access to paid television 
advertising time,  it has no application to groups like ADI that are not political parties 
                                                 
50
 Lord Bingham considered that in limited circumstances, a s 3 HRA challenge might be possible, para 
34. 
51
  See ProLife Alliance (n 40) paras 33 – 36 (Lord Hoffmann). 
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and, as a consequence, do not have access to such free broadcast time.  ADI was in 
exactly the same position as the Pensioners Party in as much as the only way for it to 
communicate its message using television was through paid advertising.  
   
   It is reasonably clear, after Pensioners Party, that the Court‘s earlier judgment in 
VgT cannot be regarded as an aberration and banished to the adjudicative wilderness.  
The judgment confirms that the Court was plumbing deep free speech waters in VgT 
rather than, as has been suggested by some, merely skimming their surface.  It 
confirms that blanket broadcasting bans on political and social advocacy advertising 
will be likely to breach article 10 in those situations where there are limited 
opportunities to communicate such messages on television in comparison to others.  
  
   In November 2008 Animal Defenders International made an application to the 
European Court of Human Rights claiming not that s 321 of the Communications Act 
was incompatible with article 10 (as it had, of necessity, claimed before the national 
courts), but rather that its right to freedom of expression had been violated by the 
denial of the chance to broadcast its message.  Given the Strasbourg court‘s 
continuing strong defence of broadcast political speech in Pensioners Party, and its 
focus on the impact of restrictions on individual applicants, it would seem as though 
the organisation has a very strong chance of success. 
 
   Of course it is still legitimate for states to impose limitations on political advertising 
in the broadcast media in order to protect the integrity of the democratic process. But 
the easy ‗legislative fix‘ of imposing a blanket ban on the basis that it is ‗just too 
difficult‘ to devise a more finely tuned solution will not pass muster at Strasbourg.  As 
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noted above, the obiter dicta of their Lordships in ADI itself nudged the door ajar for 
future challenges to the Communications Act ban.
52
  The judgment of the European 
Court of Human Rights in Pensioners Party, it is submitted, flings that door wide 
open.   
 
 
Tom Lewis, Nottingham Law School, Nottingham Trent University. 
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  See Lewis and Cumper (n 20) at 106. 
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